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More on the Categorial Ana]ysis of Grammatical Relations1< 
David R. Dowty 
0 . Introduction 
Syntactic and semantic analyses of natural languages produced since 
the mid 1970's by linguists who adopted Richard Montague's ideas about 
semantics differed from previous research in three ways : First, this 
work used a more sophisticated and explicitly-formulated semantic theory . 
Second, it did not involve a level of "semantic representation" at all 
but rather what Bach (1980) has termed "rule-to-rule" semantics, that 
is, each syntactic rule is associated with a semantic rule that directly 
gives the conditions of truth and denotation of the constituent formed 
by the syntactic rule. Third, it adopted the methodology of doing syntactic 
and semantic analysis of each construction simultaneously. By looking 
at the relationship.between syntax and semantics in this new way, researchers 
were led to ignore the traditional transformational analyses of Passive, 
Equi, Raising and such rules, and to generate such sentences syntactically 
in terms of their surface structure alone. (Cf . Partee ' s "Well-Formedness 
Constraint," Partee 1979). The resulting theory is radically "monostratal" 
in every sense of the word : it involves neither multiple levels of syntac-
tic structure on the one hand, nor any levels of "semantic representation",
1"logical form", etc . , on the other . Rather, the syntactic analysis 
tree of a sentence (the series of steps by which it is put together syntacti-
cally) and the semantic rules (which correspond one-for-one to syntactic 
steps) are the sole determinants of the compositional semantics of a 
sentence . The most recent widely-known version of such a theory is the 
Generalized Phrase Structure Grammar (GPSG) of Gazdar (1982) and others, 
which restricts syntactic rules to context-free PS rules . 
In a series of papers (Dowty 1975, 1978, 1982) I have compared these 
sorts of theories with the claims of universal generalizations about 
grammatical relations presented in Relational Grammar (Perlmutter and 
Postal 1977) and proposed tentatively that all important generalizations 
about grammatical relations can be captured in this monostratal Montague-
type analysis. I will very briefly review this approach in §1 and then 
go on to discuss two issues which it raises: relational-changing rules 
which apparently apply to more than one grammatical relation (§2) and 
the distinction between Equi and Raising Verbs and the treatment of "dununy" 
NPs (§3). Those familiar with (Dowty 1978) or (Dowty 1982) may skip 
directly to §2, (p. 108). 
1. The Categorial Analysis of Grammatical Relation . 
In these earlier papers, 1 proposed essentially that so-called gram-
matical relations can be adequately treated simply as an artifact of 
the hierarchical order in which a multi-place verb combines with its 
various arguments . Following Montague's (1973) lead, I suggest that 
a multi-place verb of n arguments always be represented as a functor 
combining with one argument to give a n- 1 place verb (phrase) as its 
value; this may be termed the "Montague-Schoenfinkel" principle, after 
Schoenfinkel (1924) and Montague (1973) : 
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(1) (Montague-Schoenfinkel principle). A multi-place verb of n 
arguments is always represented as a functor of one argument 
that yields a _!!;-1 place verb (phrase) as its value . 
By using (1) recursively, it follows that a verb need only combine with 
one argument at a time, no matter how many arguments it ultimately receives. 
By this principle, verbs of one, two, and three NP arguments will be 
assigned to the categories listed in (2): 
(2) Categories of verb/verb phrases: 
Symbol Categorial Definition Name 
IV S/NP intransitive VP 
TV IV/NP transitive VP 
TTV TV/NP ditransitive VP 
Syntactic rules (whose semantic interpretation is functional application) 
will then combine a NP with any verb on this hierarchy to yield a phrase 
of the next higher category as output (or in the case of IV, yielding 
a sentence as output) . Of course, other obligatory complements of a 
verb, such as infinitive VPs, PPs and Adjectives, will also be treated 
as arguments of a verb in this one-step-at-a-time fashion, but I won't 
discuss these here . Lest such a hierarchy seem to be an unnecessary 
complication, note that it does two things which any syntactic and seman-
tic theory must do : (1) it subcategorizes verbs syntactically according 
to the number of NPs they take and (2) it provides a means for matching 
the meaning of an NP argument with the proper argument position of the 
meaning of the verb . The reason for arranging these categories so that 
each "feeds" the next higher one is that certain NPs are treated alike 
no matter how many arguments the verb has--for example, the NPs we call 
subjects are treated alike, in case marking and/or syntactic position, 
whether the verb is transitive, intransitive or ditransitive . Such a 
hierarchy predicts this, and we may in fact define grammatical relations 
in terms of it: 
(3) 1. A subject is any NP combined with an IV to produce a S . 
2. A direct object is any NP combined with a TV to produce 
an IV. 
3. An indirect object is any NP combined with a TTV to 
produce a TV. 
While these definitions and this hierarchy are putatively language-
universal, the actual syntactic operations that combine each kind of 
VP with its argument are language particular and of course vary from 
language to language . One language may combine a subject with an IV 
to produce a S by putting the NP before the verb, another by putting 
the NP after the verb, yet another by marking the NP with nominative 
case but perhaps not specifying a fixed order of subject and verb. 
According to this theoretical definition, therefore, the empirical diag-
nostic we should use in identifying subjects, direct objects, etc., in 
any natural language is (4): 
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(4) 1. Find NPs which are treated syntactically alike (in terms 
of case marking, position, and by other syntactic processes) 
with intransitive, transitive, and ditransitive verbs; 
these NPs are subjects. 
2. Find NPs which are not subjects but are treated alike with 
transitives and ditransitives; these are direct objects. 
3. Find NPs which are not subjects or direct objects (and 
are treated alike in ditransitives and four-place verbs 
if any); these are indirect objects. 
Of course, languages are not always completely uniform in the way they 
treat the arguments of one of these verbal categories. German, for example, 
marks the argument of most of its two-place verbs with accusative case 
but that of other two-place verbs with dative case, still others with 
genitive . It will thus sometimes be necessary to distinguish syntactic 
subcategories of verbs of a given number of arguments for the purpose 
of case marking. Other syntactic rules may observe this subcategory 
distinction as well; for example, German two-place verbs that take accusa-
tive objects will passivize, but those taking datives will not . To accord 
with traditional terminology, I will reserve the terms subject and object, 
transitive and ditransitive to refer to the largest or unmarked class 
of verbs of each number of argument and make up new terms, if necessary, 
for the arguments of the exceptional verbs. For example, I will refer 
to the third NP in (5) as indirect object in English, but the third NP 
in (6) is not marked with~. even though it occupies the parallel posi-
tion in the argument hierarchy of the verb, so the verb spare must be 
put in a distinct subcategory from tell; I will thus call this third NP 
in (6) a secondary?bject: --
(5) Mary told the story to John . (John is indirect object; give 
of category TV/NP[+to]' or DTV) 
(6) Mary spared John the trouble. (the trouble is secondary object; 
spare of category TV/NP[ ] , or TTV)-to 
Because of this complication, grammatical relations will not always be 
completely definable in terms of the semantics of the argument hierarchy: 
the verb's syntactic category (which determines its "grammatical rela-
tions" on the syntactic side), to be sure, uniquely determines the type 
of function it denotes , but the type of function a verb denotes will 
not quite determine its syntactic category in the case where the language 
has two or more distinct subcategories for this configuration of arguments. 
To avoid weakening the explanation of grammatical relations and relation-
changing rules (cf. below), I propose we should always ask for independent 
motivation for such subcategorization. For example, it would be legitimate 
to appeal to subcategorization of two-place verbs into two classes to 
explain the lack of passives for some of them only if the language treats 
this same subclass of two-place verbs differently in some other way as 
well, for example, in case marking . 
Another important distinction for the argument hierarchy theory 
is between the arguments of a verb (subject, object, indirect object, 
and other obligatory complements) and modifiers of a verb (in the case 
of NPs, locatives, benefactives and instrumentals are usually modifiers, 
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cf. Dowty 1982, 89-90). Modifiers are treated as functors which map 
a VP into a new VP of the same type, e.g. an IV into an IV . 
With the distinction defined this way, the diagnostic for separating 
arguments from modifiers should be two-fold: whereas modifiers such 
as locatives, instrumentals and benefactives are compatible (up to the 
limits of real-world plausibility) with verbs of any number of argument 
places, the number of true arguments a verb takes is fixed by the lexical 
meaning and subcategory of a verb. Second, a modifier (as the names 
"instrumental," "locative" and "benefactive" indicate) contributes to 
meaning in the same way in any sentence in which it is used, whereas 
the semantic role played by an argument depends entirely on the lexical 
meaning of the verb--a subject or object, for example, may denote a thing 
that comes to exist with one verb, a thing that ceases to exist with 
another, an experiencer of an emotion with a third, and so on. 
Ultimately, however, I have argued (Dowty 1982, 116-119) that the 
distinction between arguments and modifiers should be recognized as somewhat 
fluid from the point of view of language change and language acquisition, 
if we are to explain the large number of convergent case markings in 
various languages between the two kinds of NPs, e . g . between datives 
and benefactives, or between agents of passives and instrumentals . What 
for the child (or at an earlier stage of the language) are NP modifiers 
of an _£-place verb may later be reanalyzed as NP arguments of a ~+l place 
verb. 
Since we are dealing with a monostratal syntactic theory, so-called 
"relation changing rules" are not analyzed as rules which change the 
grammatical status of a NP argument but are rather treated as rules which 
alter the grarmnatical and semantic properties of a verb (or verb phrase) 
itself before its NP arguments are combined with it. Specifically, the 
denotation of a verb or verb phrase is an ~-place relation, and the semantic 
effect of relation-changing rules is to perform simple algebraic operations 
on verb meanings, operations such as reducing an n-place relation to 
a n-1 place relation, rearranging the argument places of a relation , 
or-expanding an n-place relation to an n+l place relation. Agentless 
passive and indefinite object "deletion" are examples of relation-changing 
rules which reduce a relation by eliminating the subject or object argument, 
respectively. Agentive Passive, Dative Shift, and the Raising rules 
are examples of operations which rearrange the argument hierarchy of 
a VP. Finally, causative rules and rules for the "applied" forms in 
Bantu languages are examples of relation-expanding rules (rules which 
increase the number of argument positions of a verb phrase) . Formaliza-
tions of all of these rules can be found in (Dowty 1982), so for now, 
let me illustrate the application of relation-changing rules, as well 
as the derivation of sentences with unchanged grammatical relations, 
by only a few examples. 
The agentless passive rule in English can be given the (somewhat 
simplified) formulation in (7): it converts a transitive verb to a passive 
intransitive verb syntactically, and semantically it existentially quantifies 
the verb's original subject and reinterprets its new subject like the 
original direct object: 
(7) (Agentless Passive) . If as TV, then F (a) s IV, where
7
F (a ) = be a+EN. 
7
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Translation : >..1> [o: ' (1> ) (3x*)] 
(here , "(3x1t)" abbreviates "(P3 xP {x })" 
Dative Shift can be formulated as in (8) : syntactically, it shifts a 
verb between the two English subcategories of three-place verbs 1 mentioned 
earlier, that is, from DTV (the cate gory of dative transitive verbs) 
to TTV (the category of ditransitive verbs). Semantically, the rule 
alters the meaning of the original verb by inverting the direct and indirect 
arguments: 
(8) (Dative Shift). If tH DTV, then F ( o: ) E.: TTV, where F (a ) = ct.
8 8 
Translation: )'P !" 1> i -·,t> [a.' ( 1' )( 'P ) ( 1'3)]3 2 1
The analysis tree in (9) illustrates a sentence with a three-place verb 
in which neither of these two rules is used; (10) is an example with 
Agent-less Passive alone; (11) is an example with Dative Shift , and (12) 
illustrates the use of both rules. By the translation rules given in 
(7) and (8), all three sentences will receive logically equivalent inter-
pretations, specifically, that of the translation (9 ' ) . 
(9) [Someone gave a book to Mary]S 
[give a book to Mary]IV 
someoneNP 
[give to~boo~ 
-~~M
giveDTV aryNP 
(9 ' ) 3x3y[book ' (y) ~ give ' (x,y,m)] 
(10) [A book was given 
[be given to Mary]IV (by rule 7) 
I 
[give to Mary]TV 
- ~ giveDTV aryNP 
(11) [Someone a book] S 
someoneNP 
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(12) [Mary was given a book]S 
[be give! a book]TV 
[give a book]TV 
gi~o~P
.1 
giveDTV 
(The Raising rules, not given here, will also interact with passive 
to produce and correctly interpret those examples which are produced 
in transformational accounts by successive 'movement' of a NP through 
various clauses, though of course no movement is involved in this analysis.) 
One thing that should be noted in these analysis trees is that a 
transitive verb phrase is uniformly combined with the direct object NP 
not by simply concatenating the two phrases but rather by inserting the 
object NP after the first word in the phrasal transitive verb. This 
operation, dubbed "Right Wrap" by Emmon Bach (1980), is motivated by 
other cases of transitive VPs in English, as well as by the need for 
this operation in the subject-plus-IV combination rule for VSO languages. 
This is of course a non-context-free operation, but Gerald Gazdar and 
Ivan Sag (Gazdar and Sag 1981) have shown how to reconstruct the effect 
of this operation in a context-free grammar by the use of metarules. 
They employ the same rules for generating phrasal transitive verbs as 
in this analysis, but no rule of their grammar actually permits the node 
TV to be dominated by another node. Instead, Gazdar and Sag propose 
a metarule which specifies that for any rule producing a transitive VP, 
there is to be another rule producing an IV that is exactly like it except 
that it has an additional NP immediately following the verb. The category 
transitive verb is thus a "phantom category" whose only syntactic function 
is to induce IVs with object NPs by means of this metarule; the categorial 
analysis of grammatical relations is still maintained in their analysis, 
but their grammar remains context-free . In this paper, however, I will 
leave the question open whether this metarule approach is preferable 
or whether grammars should contain non-context-free operations such as 
Right Wrap. 
This account of grammatical relations, I have argued, gives a superior 
account of many natural language phenomena (Dowty 1982, 98-108) . These 
include, briefly, (1) it predicts that relation-changing rules are structure-
preserving, (2) it predicts that the morphemes signifying relation-changing 
rules such as passive appear on verbs, rather than elsewhere in the sentence, 
(3) it predicts that if relation-changing rules are lexically governed, 
they should be governed by verbs, rather than other elements of the 
sentence, (4) it permits relation-changing rules to be formulated in 
the same way whether they are syntactic rules (i.e. fully "productive" ) 
or lexical rules (partially productive) in a given language, (5) it permits 
an elegant explanation of certain "discontinuous constituents" such as 
the constituent "verb phrase" in VSO languages like Breton , (6) it gives 
rise to a simple explanation of the distinction between subject controlled 
complements, as with the verb promise, and object-controlled complements 
as with the verb persuade, (7) it predicts the behavior of derived causa-
tives which led Newmeyer (1976) and Aissen (1974) to propose that causative 
I 
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is a precyclic transformation, (8) it allows a simple yet adequate account 
of the "wanna" contraction facts, (9) and perhaps most important of alL 
suggest that it provides a natural and fairly adequate account of "gram-
matical relations" which neither takes grammatical relations as completely 
primitive concepts, nor makes reference to multiple levels of syntactic 
description, nor requires that grannnatical relations be defined in any 
way in terms of so-called thematic relations such as agent , patient, 
goal, theme, etc ., nor in terms of any intermediate level of description 
between syntax and semantic interpretation (i . e . denotations and truth 
conditions) . This last point is particularly important to keep in mind 
in comparing the categorial analysis of grammatical relations with other, 
more complex accounts involving multiple levels . For if these more compli-
cated accounts purport to capture certain linguistic generalizations 
which the categorial analysis does not, then it behooves us to examine 
these putative generalizations to see whether they are really so signifi-
cant or so cross-linguistically val:ld to outweigh the relative theoreti-
2cal complexity which these other accounts require . 
2 . Rules Generalized over Grammatical Relations 
2. 1. Passives 
Having now sketched the outli nes of the categorial account of gram-
matical relations and relation- changing rules, I turn to some unresolved 
problems for this analysis . 
The first kind of problem is the case of languages where it has 
been suggested that two NPs behave as direct object (DO) in the same 
clause simultaneously. For example, Seiter ' s (1979) analysis of Nieuean 
proposes that this language has a rule which advances an instrumental 
NP to DO . This advanced instrumental then participates in several 
syntactic processes that are otherwise restricted to subjects and objects, 
but the original DO NP still participates in these same processes after 
the instrumental has been advanced. 
Similarly in a number of Bantu languges, there is a construction 
in which a NP with locative, benefactive or instrumental meaning appears 
in the syntactic position of the DO and behaves, with respect to other 
syntactic rules, as if it were a DO . (Yet the original DO still passivizes . ) 
In the categorial analysi s , this will be a case of a relation-expanding 
rule in which the added NP appears as the DO of the derived verb and 
the original DO becomes the secondary object of the new verb. The syntactic 
rule for the benefactive construction of this group can be described 
by the rule in (13): 
(13) (Bantu applied benefactive construction) 
If a£ TV , then F (a ) £ TTV. (For Chichewa, F (a ) = a +(e/i)r).
13 13
Translation : A1> 
1
>.. "t>i 't:> [ben ' ( 1> ) (a ' (~ )) ( ,S:, )]3 2 1 3
The corresponding translation rule specifies that the meaning of the 
direct object of the new verb will be used semantically as a benefactive 
VP modifier would be used in English: ben' is here a constant denoting 
the benefactive relation . The secondary object of the new verb is inter-
preted as the 00 of the original verb. The illustrative analysis tree 
(14) is based on Chichewa data from Trithart (1979) : 
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(14) [Joni a-na-(wa)-ph- er-a ana n-khuku]NP 
(he)(past indic) 
Jon½rP [(wa-) ph-er ana n-khuku]IV 
(the~~ 
[ph-er n-khuku]TV an~ ~ (children) 
[ph-er]TV//T n-khuk~p
I (chicken) 
pb-TV 
(kill) 
'John killed the chicken for the children . ' 
Translation: (ben'(the-children'))(kill'(the chicken'))(John ' ) 
This construction has been viewed as a problem for the theory of Relational 
Grammar for two reasons . First, as Trithart observes , there is no corres-
ponding sentence, in many of these languages, in which the benefactive, 
instrumental or locative surfaces in unadvanced form, so there is no 
purely syntactic motivation for this advancement rule . The second problem, 
the one which is of interest to us, is that in "applied" sentences, sen-
tences like (14), it is possible to passivize not only the putatively 
"advanced" instrumental, benefactive or locative but also the original 
NP as well . Thus corresponding to the active sentence (15), there are 
two passive forms (16a) and (16b): 
(15) Catherine a- na- (wa-) phik- ir - a a-na n-s1ma 
Catherine she past them cook apl. indic children nsima 
'Catherine cooked nsima for the children.' 
(16) a . a-na a- na (yi) phik-ir - idw -a n-sima 
children they past (it) cook apl. pass indic 
'The children were cooked nsima.' 
b . n-sima yi-na (yi) phik ir - idw - a a-na 
nsima it past (it) cook apl. pass indic children 
'Nsima was cooked (for) the children.' 
Of course, we do not have to go so far from home to see this sort 
of problem, for it can be found in some dialects of English as well. 
If example (18) indicates a case where an indirect object has been advanced 
to DO, vis-a-vis (17), 
(17) John gave a book to Mary. 
(18) John gave Mary a book . 
then if Passive indeed applies only to DO (which is to say, in the cate-
gorial analysis, that it applies only to transitive verb phrases), then 
the only passive corresponding to (18) should be (19); in some dialects, 
however , the passive (20) is acceptable as well : 
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(19) Mary was given a book (by John) . 
(20) A book was given Mary (by John) . 
This example , and the Chichewa case (16), present a problem both for 
the categorial analysis and for early versions of Relational Grammar . 
In Relational Grammar, this situation conflicts either with the Chomage 
condition or the Strata! Uniqueness Condition . If we try to maintain 
that the second NP after the verb in (18) is a demoted DO, then the Chomage 
Condition is violated in examples like (10), since a NP that is en chomage 
is not supposed to be advanceable by Passive or other advancement rules . 
If on the other hand we maintain that both NPs following the verb are 
DOs at the time that Passive applies, then the Stratal Uniqueness Law 
is violated, which states that only one NP can occupy a single grammatical 
relation at a given stage of the derivation. 
Because of cases like this where more than one NP seems to behave 
as a DO (and especially because of cases like Niuean where several 
syntactic processes seem to identify two NPs as DOs), some relational 
grammarians (Seiter 1979, Keenan and Gary 1977) have indeed proposed 
that Strata! Uniqueness be abandoned . In the theory of Relational Grammar 
it is possible in principle to dispense with this law and still leave 
the theory otherwise intact, for that theory is presently formulated 
as a large body of axioms (including Stratal Uniqueness) which are theore-
tically independent of one another, hence any one can be deleted without 
any inconsistency. In the categorial analysis, on the other hand, this 
move is not possible, for the equivalent of Stratal Uniqueness is not 
an axiom but a principle which follows automatically from the Montague-
3Schoenfinkel method of defining grammatical relations in the first place. 
Rather, the categorial analysis seems to force us to the claim that 
these two NPs bear distinct grammatical relations; therefore since both 
of them can passivize there is no alternative in the categorial analysis 
but to suppose that there are two distinct passive operations involved 
here: one the regular passive (which passivizes a transitive verb phrase 
and thus leads to the sentence (19)) and another, which I have called 
in earlier papers (Dowty 1978, 1981) the second passive rule, is responsible 
for the passive form (20). This second passive rule can be formulated 
as (21) for English : it passivizes a ditransitive verb and yields a 
passive transitive verb as a result; this passive transitive verb then 
combines with a NP argument as illustrated in (22) to form an intransitive 
passive verb phrase. 
(21) (2nd passive rule). If a~ TTV, then F (a) E TV[+pass],
p 
where F (a ) = be a +en. 
p 
TransJation: >.. i) 1>..'f.> [a ' (i:> ) Ct\) (3x*)]2 2
(22) [The book was given Mary]S 
[b~ss] 
[belgiven]TV[+pass] MaryNP 
[give]TTV 
.1 
giveTV/PP[+to] 
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.. 
The second passive rule for Chichewa and other Bantu languages would be 
exactly parallel to this English rule; a sample analysis tree is given in 
(23): 
(23) [ns1ma yi-na-y1-phik-it-idw-a ana)s 
fphik-ir-idw ana]IV[ ] n-sima 
~~pass (nsima) 
[phik-ir-idw]TV(+ ] anaI pass (children) 
[phik]TTV
I 
[phik]TV 
'Nsirna was cooked (for) the children . ' 
This method of "doubling" the passive rule will be at least observationally 
adequate for any language in which secondary objects as well as direct 
objects passivize, and other syntactic rules that apply to both direct 
and secondary objects in various languages (e.g . quantifier floating in 
Niuean) can likewise be "doubled". However, this method is open to the 
charge of missing a significant generalization , namely, that these rules 
in these languages all seem to be treating direct objects and secondary 
objects exactly alike and therefore should preferably be described by 
a single passive rule (or a single quantifier floating rule, etc.) 
that applies to direct and secondary object position indifferently. 
Although I have made it clear why the two kinds of passive rule cannot 
literally be the same rule under the categorial analysis, we could however 
capture the generalization in question here by making the passive a rule 
schema which applies to more than one category of verb phrase. This is 
exactly what I now propose to do. 
First, let us rename the categories intransitive verb phrase, transi-
tive verb phrase, and ditransitive verb phrase by designating them all 
with the symbol V plus a numerical subscript indicating the number of 
arguments the verb takes, as indicated in (24): 
(24) = intransitive verb phrase (categorially , IV)vl 
= transitive verb phrases (categorially, TV, or IV/T)v2 
= ditransitive verb phrases (categorially, TTV, or TV/T)v3 
The generalized passive rule is now written as (25): 
(25) (Generalized Passive Rule) . If a £ V, then F (a) s 
n p 
Vn-l[+pass]' where n ranges over .. . 
(For simplicity I discuss only agentless passives in this paper, since 
the rule for agentive passives is parallel in all essential respects.) 
For English dialects that do not permit the second passive, the value 
of n in this schema must be specified as exactly 2, i.e. the rule converts 
a transitive verb phrase to a passive intransitive verb phrase and does 
nothing else . For the other dialect (and for the passive rule in Chichewa) , 
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the value of n must be allowed to be equal to or greater than 2, hence 
the rule may also convert a ditransitive VP into a passive transitive 
VP, thus giving rise to derivations like (22) as well as "regular" pass-
ives like Mary was given a book. 
Now consider how the corresponding semantic rule may be schematized. 
The translation rule we want to arrive at for the case where the input 
phrase a is a transitive verb is (26a), and the rule we want for the case 
where the input phrase is ditransitive is (26b) : what do these two trans-
lations have in common? 
(26) a. For n = 2: >. p [a' (1J )(Jx*)]1 1 
b . For n = 3 : >.1'/1 1:>1[a' C1:> ) Ci' ) Px*) J1 2
c . For n = 4: >. i'2"10 >.1' [a' (1> ) (1' ) ( 1' ) (3 xit) ]3 1 1 2 3
d. For n = 1: [a' (3x*)] 
It seems that both these cases can be characterized as "advancing" by 
semantic means the lowest argument of a verb (its direct or secondary 
object) to its highest argument (i.e . its subject) and putting an "exis-
tential quantifier" in place of the original highest argument . Now I 
presently know of no cases where such a generalized passive rule needs 
to apply to a four-place verb, but as long as we are schematizing the 
rule, let us go ahead and hypothesize, for the sake of illustration and 
for concreteness, what such a generalized rule might do in this case. 
Suppose in this case that the rule needs to advance the lowest argument 
to the highest one , existentially quantify the original highest argument 
position, and leave the intermediate arguments in the same hierarchy. 
Then the translation rule we would want for this case is the one in (26c). 
Now in order to write the schematized translation let me introduce some 
abbreviations: 
(27) ;>,.(l, •.• n) abbreviates ;>,."'P 
1 
;>,.'f 
2
.• . >. 1> n 
a(l, ... n) abbreviates a(~ 1) (1' 2) · · · c-to n) 
A lambda in front of a parenthesized ellipsis 1 through n abbreviates 
a sequence of lambda operators each attached to the respective variables 
"P 1 , ·f> 2. etc . through 1> . A predicate a in front of an ellipsis 1 through 
E_ indicates the predicat~ applied first to the argument ~ l' then to 
the argument ,P 2 , and so on, until finally applied to f' We now write the schematized translation rule as (28). n 
(28) (Translation rule for Generalized Passive): 
;>,.(2, ...n-1, 1) [a ' (1, ...n-1) (3x'')] 
The numbers 1 and 2 which appear in this rule must of course be under-
stood to be limited by the value of E_ : that is, if E_ = 2, then '1> 
2 
does 
not actually appear in this instance in the translation rule (i.e. in 
(26a)) since the last element in the ellipsis is n-1, which is 1. 
Similarly, if v1e considered the instance of the schema where n = 1, then 
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!!-1 is zero and both ellipses represent empty sequences. hence the inter-
pretation of the translation schema for n = 1 is (26d). 
Now the particular notation I have chosen to represent this schema-
tized translation rule may be a bit clumsy and could in any case be written 
in other ways. All that is involved here. as far as the model-theoretic 
interpretation which these translations represent is concerned. is simply 
generalized operations over !!-place relations. operations such as reducing 
an n-place relation to an n-1 place relation or inverting an n-place rela-
tion. w. v. Quine. for example. discusses just these operations in his 
article "Variables explained away". Quine (1966). but he symbolizes these 
generalized operations not by lambda expressions but by defining single 
operator symbols which represent each generalized operation. The trans-
lation rule here could be written much more simply in Quine's notation 
by prefixing to a first the operator which inverts a relation and then 
prefixing in turn the operator which reduces a relation by one place (by 
existentially quantifying its last argument position). However. I t:hink 
the notation I have used here may be a bit more perspicuous for our purposes. 
This use of a passive rule schema gives us a way of saying. in effect. 
that the language simply does not distinguish between transitive and 
ditransitive verb phrases when it comes to applying the passive rule. 
If this is a significant fact about some languages. then presumably this 
means that transitive and ditransitive verb phrases (or equivalently. 
the notions direct object and secondary object) form a natural syntactic 
class. If so. then we might want to make this fact explicit by proposing 
that a syntactic feature defines this class. and use this feature to restrict 
the passive schema. rather than restricting the value of the numerical 
subscript in the rule schema. We might thus distinguish the various tran-
sitivity classes of verb phrases by a system of two features such as (29): 
(29) Transitivity classes defined by syntactic features 
[+nuclear] {Vl. V2} (the set of transitive and 
intransitive VPs) 
[+transitive] {V2• V3} (the set of transitive and 
ditransitive VPs) 
Here the feature [+nuclear] (a term borrowed from Relational Grammar) 
designates the putatively natural class of 1-place and 2-place predicates. 
while the feature [+transitive] designates the class of 2-place and 3-
place predicates. Combinations of values for the two features can also 
single out intransitives. transitives. and ditransitives separately. With 
this system. we could say that in Chichewa and in some dialects of English 
the passive rule applies to the class [+transitive]. while in other dialects 
of English (those that do not allow sentences such as A book was given 
Mary). the passive rule applies to the class [+nuclear, +transitive]. 
Whether such "natural classes" are actually well-motivated. however, is 
a question I would like to leave open for now. 
The use of rule schema to abbreviate a sequence of individual rules 
is reminiscent of Gerald Gazdar's (1982) use of schema to represent rules 
for conjunctions of n constituents. However. I do not believe the .idea 
of schematizing rules to apply to predicates of varying numbers of arguments 
is very familiar, so let me motivate this idea by suggesting some further 
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applications for it. Since we have employed this schema to generalize 
passive over transitives and ditransitives, we might also ask whether 
languages might generalize passive "upward", that is, so that it applies 
to intransitives as well as transitives. In fact, I suggest this is just 
what does happen in the case of impersonal passives . That is, if n is 
set equal to 1, then the generalized passive rule (25) will derive-a zero-
place predicate from an intransitive verb phrase and will give the appro-
priate semantics for an impersonal passive, namely that of the case (26d) 
above. (I should point out that von Stechow (1979) has also proposed 
a treatment of passives and impersonal passives in German that is much 
like what I am proposing here.) Of course, further syntactic details 
of impersonal pasives in various languages will still have to be specified; 
for example, some languages such as German allow a dummy "it" in impersonal 
passives (cf. (30)), 
(30) Es wird heute getanzt. 
and some other means besides the generalized passive rule must be found 
for introducing this dununy. However, it has been observed (Curme, 1924; 
Nerbonne, this volume) that this "it" in German is definitely un-subject-
like and fails to behave as subjects in German ordinarily do in a number 
of ways (even though other dummies in the language, such as "weather" 
it and the it of extraposition, do behave as subjects in all these same 
respects). Nerbonne concludes that the best analysis of (30) is that 
it is a subjectless sentence. Also, languages such as Turkish (Perlmutter 
1978) have impersonal passives but have no dunrrny subjects at all. If 
there are other languages in which impersonal passives exhibit a dummy 
that is truly a subject in all respects, then a modification of the 
generalized passive rule I have given will be necessary here. 
It may also be noted that this treatment of impersonal passives will 
permit impersonal passives to be formed on transitive and other verb phrases 
as well. For when a transitive verb has combined with its object, it 
then constitutes an intransitive verb phrase, and this phrase can undergo 
impersonal passivization just like a VP consisting of a lexical intransi-
tive verb alone. On the other hand, impersonal passive might be a lexical 
rule in some languages (just as any relation-changing rule might be, under 
the categorial analysis, cf. Dowty 1982), but if it is a lexical rule 
it could not be fed by syntactically complex expressions such as verb 
phrases consisting of a transitive verb plus object. Thus it is a predic-
tion of this kind of analysis that if impersonal passivization has lexical 
exceptions in a language, then transitive verbs should not have impersonal 
passives in that language, and conversely, if a language does permit imper-
sonal passives with transitive verbs, then it is a syntactic rule and 
should not have lexical exceptions. (This is a prediction parallel to 
one made about regular passives of transitive verbs in the categorial 
approach: the regular passive rule might be either a lexical or a syntac-
tic rule in general, but if it is a lexical rule, it should be fed only 
by lexical transitive verbs, not by syntactically complex transitive verb 
phrases. Since English, for example, does exhibit passives of complex 
transitive verb phrases, it follows in this theory that passive in English 
is a syntactic rule, a position that has been defended at length by Emmon 
Bach (1980) • ) 4 
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[buy to read t~ Peac~ 
2.2. Purpose Clauses 
A second case where we might employ rule schema generalizing over 
grannnatical relations is the case of the purpose classes discussed by 
Errunon Bach (1982). Bach has claimed that infinitival purpose clauses, 
such as that exemplified in (31), are restricted to transitive verb phrases, 
or else are the arguments of one of a handful of verbs lexically subcate-
gorized for them such as have and be. Thus (32) is unacceptable , according 
to Bach, because the verb come in is intransitive. 
(31) They brought in the Dean for us to talk to. 
(32) *The Dean came in for us to talk to . 
Bach's analysis of a sentence such as (33) is that the purpose clause 
is a modifier of a transitive verb phrase, so the sentence (33) has a 
syntactic analysis (34) : 
(33) John bought War and Peace to read to the children. 
(34) [John bought War and Peace to read to the children]
8 
[to read to tie children]TV/TV buyTV 
(PRO) to read him to the children
3 
This transitive verb modifier is formed by syntactically and semantically 
binding the DO variable him within the clause : this will ultimately
3be bound by the DO of the matrix clause. The subject of the purpose clause, 
here PRO, is however an instance of free control according to Bach; its 
interpretation is determined by various semantic and pragmatic conditions, 
but its binding is not a matter of compositional semantics at all . Purpose 
clauses are subject to further semantic and pragmatic conditions, but 
they are not of interest to us here. 
Unfortunately £or Bach ' s claim, there are counterexamples to i t in 
his own paper. These are cases such as (35) . 
(35) John gave Mary War and Peace to read to the children . 
Assuming the analysis of ditransitive give which I have argued for (and 
which Bach likewise assumes) , it is not the NP War and Peace which is 
the grammatical DO in (35) but rather the NP Mary. Nevertheless , it is 
War and Peace which clearly binds the gap in the purpose clause in this 
sentence. Notice that it would not help Bach ' s position to suppose that 
there is a second syntactic analysis for give in this case according to 
which the NP War and Peace is the true grammatical DO . This is because 
(36) shows that Mary can be passivized in this example , and this clearly 
±ndi cates that Mary is the true no . 
(36) Mary was given War and Peace to read to the children . 
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Just to complete the picture, let us note that there are also cases with 
the dative form of the verb give and a purpose clause (37), and here War 
and Peace IS the granunatical DO. 
(37) John gave War and Peace to Mary to read to the children . 
(38) War and Peace was given to Mary to read to the children. 
AOthough both the DO and the secondary object of a verb like give can 
bind the gap in the purpose clause, it is not the case that just any NP 
within the matrix VP can bind this gap . Note that in (39) the gap can 
only be bound by the object NP the book, not by the (pragmatically more 
plausible) prepositional object the table: 
(39) John put the book on the table to study on. 
We could of course salvage Bach's analysis by supposing that such purpose 
clauses are systematically ambiguous--that they may modify either transitive 
verb phrases such as give to Mary in (37), or ditransitive verbs such 
as give in (35); in either case, the object NP next added to the VP would 
be the one binding the gap in the purpose clause. (For pragmatic reasons 
discussed by Bach, only one reading would be apparent in each sentence.) 
Such a suggestion would be open to the charge of failing to capture a 
generalization. But here again, we could counter this objection by formu-
lating the purpose clause rule as a rule schema which applies to both 
transitive and ditransitive phrases, just as we did with passives . This 
generalized rul e might be written as in (40): 
(40) (Generalized Purpose Clause Rule). If a£ V and S £ IV, then 
n 
F (a , S) £ V, where F40 (a , S) = a to 8', 8 ' being 8 40,m n ,m· 
with~ deleted. Here, n .:_ 1 (or, equivalently, the rule 
applies to V )
[+transitive]· 
Translation : ~(l, ...n)[a '(l, .. . n) A intend-
that'(....., ,~[ i0 { x [S'(z))}])J-- .·rn m1
The second half of this translation rule is for illustrative purposes 
and should not be taken too seriously; it may only roughly approximate 
the meaning of purpose clauses . (The variable z on the right is to be 
a free variable, corresponding to the pragmatically controlled "PRO" in 
Bach's tree. ) For illustration, (41) and (42) are analysis trees in which 
the two instances of this schema have applied, the purpose clause modifying 
a transitive VP in the first case, a ditransitive VP in the second : 
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(41) [John gave War and Peace to Mary to read to the childrenJ
giv~ryNP 
(42) [John gave Mary War and Peace to read to the children]
8 
[give Mary War and Peace to read to the children]IV Joh°NP 
8 
[give War and Peace to 
[give to Mary to-----
[give to Mary]TV 
childrenJTV War and Peace-------NP 
to the children1V 
Joh~P 
[give War and Pea~ to the children]TV MaryNP 
[give to read to War and Peace NP 
giv~TV 
The translation rule schema will assign the proper interpretation 
to teach of these trees: that is, the NP War and Peace will bind the 
object gap in the purpose clause in each case. 
2 . 3. Reflexive Control 
Next, I will point out a case where generalized rules can be used 
to efficiently describe a process that applies to both direct objects 
and subjects in English. In their paper "Passives and Reflexives in Phrase 
Structure Grammar" (Gazdar and Sag 1981) Gerald Gazdar and Ivan Sag show 
how the syntactic distribution and semantic binding of reflexive pronouns 
in English can be treated in a Generalized Phrase Structure Granunar . There 
are two syntactic positions in English which control reflexive pronouns : 
subject and object. Gazdar and Sag's analysis involves two rules whose 
translation specifies this semantic binding . By making the slight nota-
tional changes necessary to recast their analysis in the grammatical 
format I have adopted here, we might restate their analysis as the two 
rules (43) and (44): 
(43) If as IV[+SELF]' then Fi(a) s IVl-SELF](Fi is the identity 
mapping) . 
Translation: >.1;> '~ {r[a ' (r*)] } 
(44) If as TV[+SELF]' then Fi(a ) E TV[-SELF] 
Translation: >.'P ?'t\ 1\{r[u' (r*) Cf 2)]} 
assume that reflexive pronouns such as himself, herself , yourself, etc . 
carry the syntactic feature [+SELF] and that there are general syntactic 
feature conventions, essentially the same as Gazdar and Sag ' s , for passing 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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this feature and other syntactic features recursively up onto the 
syntactic category label of any constituent containing a reflexive pro-
noun. (Since Gazdar and Sag are using phrase structure rules rather than 
the inductive syntactic rules I am using, their conventions are actually 
viewed as passing such features "down" the tree rather than "up" an analy-
sis tree as I view them here; but this is not an important difference.) 
In the present version, the two rules (43) and (44) then "eliminate" this 
feature [+SELF] and at the same time specify that the argument of the 
IV or TV in question will semantically "bind" the reflexive pronoun within 
the verb phrase . These rules will then give rise to derivations such 
as (45) and (46) and will assign these the appropriate interpretations: 
(45) [John shaved himself]S 
~
[ shave himself] IV 
I 
J oh~p 
[shave himself]IV[+SELF] 
sha~elfNP[+SELF] 
(46) [Mary persuaded John to shave himself]S 
[persuade John to shave himself]IV 
[persuade ti shave himself]TV Jo~ 
persuadeTV/IV [shave himself]IV[+SELF] ~ 
shaveTV himselfNP [+SELF] 
Actually, Gazdar and Sag ' s analysis does not really involve the analogue 
of (45) and (46) as true syntactic rules but rather as metarules--that 
is, rules which take any existing syntactic rule that forms a non-reflexive 
IV or TV from non-reflexive parts and give as output a new syntactic rule 
that is identical except that it forms a non- reflexive IV or TV from consti-
tuents that do involve the feature [+SELF]. We could in fact adopt this 
metarule approach here, but I do not in the interest of expository simpli-
city: if we did use the metarule approach note that the anal ysis trees 
(45)and (46) would in fact be one node shorter , as they would lack the 
TV and IV nodes, respectively, that bear the feature [+SELF] . 
Nevertheless, the analysis involving rules (43) and (44) is suspici-
ously redundant (as is Gazdar and Sag ' s original analysis) in that it 
involves two rules and two translation rules that look exactly alike except 
that one involves the category IV where the other involves the category 
TV. 
We can, once again, avoid this redundancy by replacing both rules 
by the single rule schema (47) that generalizes over these two categories : 
[persuade to shave himself]TV[+SELF] 
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(47) (Reflexive control rule generalized) 
If a£ Vn(+SELFJ then Fi(a ) £ Vn[-SELF]; here n ..'.:. 2 (or 
equivalently, the rule takes V[ N ] as input)+ uc1ear 
Translation: A(l, ... n) >f> 1{r[a ' (r>':) (2, ...n)] } 
To conclude this section, let me say that I have proposed a method 
of generalizing syntactic rules which apply in a similar way to various 
grammatical relations so that such cases can be described by a single 
rule. To be sure, the motivation for such schema does not lie in the 
fact that any one schema generalizes over a large number of instances: 
in fact, all of the schema I have discussed here generalize over exactly 
two cases. (Arabic, however, might be at least one example of a language 
that uses a passive schema generalizing over three instances, as it appears 
to passivize either an intransitive VP, a transitive VP, or a ditransi-
tive VP indifferently--cf. Fuller (in prep.) . ) Rather, the motivation 
for such schema comes from the fact that there are apparently a large 
ntunber of cases in natural languages where a syntactic process applies 
indifferently to two adjacent "positions" on the grammatical relation 
hierarchy--either DO and secondary object, or else subject and DO . In 
the case of the two kinds of objects, I have contrasted this method with 
an alternative solution sometimes proposed by Relational Grammarians--
namely, that a language can have two NPs which are both direct objects 
at the same stage of a derivation . There are two kinds of differences 
between the two approaches. First, the theory of Relational Grammar will 
presumably always require that two NPs may never bear the same grammatical 
relation in the deepest stratum (this follows from the assumption that 
the deepest grammatical relations are always definable in a universal 
way in semantic terms). Rather, the case of two NPs bearing the same 
grammatical relation could only arise if one of the two had been promoted 
or advanced from some other relation. As I already mentioned in the Bantu 
case , however, there is sometimes no real independent syntactic motivation 
for deriving, say, an "advanced" benefactive NP from an underlying non-
direct object position, so this is an ad hoc assumption . 5 Also in English 
this kind of assumption would lead to syntactically unmotivated underlying 
strata. As far as I am aware, the dialects of English that allow a second-
ary passive with verbs like give, as exemplified in (48), 
(48) A book was given John. 
also allow secondary as well as primary passives of verbs like spare , 
deny, and forgive, as in (49)-(51): 
(49) a. The ordeal was spared us. 
b. We were spared the ordeal . 
(50) a. Our sins were forgiven us . 
b . We were forgiven our sins. 
( 51) a. A fair trial was denied him. 
b. He was denied a fair trial. 
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However, such verbs do not occur in sentences where the personal object 
occurs after the preposition to, i.e. sentences such as *Someone spared 
the ordeal to us, *Someone forgave our sins to us, etc. are ungrammatical. 
It would be ad hoc to assume that such sentences have underlying indirect 
objects in order to explain why they can come to have two direct objects 
and therefore two passives. 
A second difference between these two ways of explaining how two 
NPs can behave as direct objects is that in my account, the generalization 
of syntactic operations over grammatical relations is stated rule by rule: 
thus it allows us to say that some rules may fail to distinguish between 
two adjacent grammatical relations while other rules in the same language 
apply to only one of the cases . And in fact we want to be able to say 
this in the cases I have discussed here. Trithart observes that Chichewa 
treats the applied object (or DO) and secondary object alike with respect 
to passive, but only the applied object, not the secondary object, can 
be reflexivized. And in the case of English, many American English dialects 
treat DO and secondary object alike as far as purpose clauses go, but 
nevertheless allow only DOs to passivize. A language like Niuean is simply 
the limiting case where all syntactic rules of the language fail to dis-
tinguish between a DO and a secondary object. 
The examples I have discussed in this section do not exhaust the 
cases where generalized rules of this sort can be put to good use . One 
obvious application is the "accessibility hierarchy" for relativization. 
While I admitted in Dowty (1982) that the analysis of that paper offered 
no account of the role the Relational Hierarchy seems to play in limiting 
the accessibility of NPs to relativization (Keenan and Comrie 1977), schema 
generalized over grammatical relations can be used to replace the familiar 
"variable binding" analysis of relativization in traditional Montague 
Grammar in such a way as to permit a simple statement of Keenan and Comrie's 
generalizations. (If relativization applies to Vn+l in a given language, 
it must apply to V as well.) This analysis has been developed by Pauline 
Jacobson in her coifunents on David Perlmutter's paper at the 1981 Annual 
Meeting of the Linguistic Society of America and may appear in future 
work of Jacobson's. 
3 . Equi and Raising Verbs and the Treatment of Dummies . 
The last topic I want to address is the treatment of the distinction 
between Equi verbs and Raising verbs in the categorial analysis. 
(52) a . 
b. 
Mary tried to win. 
Mary seemed to win. 
(53) a. 
b. 
Mary persuaded John to be present. 
Mary believed John to be present. 
While classical transformational grammar assumed that pairs like (52a)-
(52b) and (53a)-(53b) have differing deep syntactic structures, more recent 
"surfacy" syntactic theories (cf. Brame 1978, Bresnan 1978, Gazdar 1982) 
of course do not. Nevertheless, many of these recent analyses persist 
in assuming that there is still somehow or other a distinction in the 
compositional semantic structure of these pairs. That is, it is suggested 
that semantic rules must sooner or later assign (52a) a semantic structure 
like (56), in which the meaning of "to win" is supplied with its own subject 
"John", a duplicate of the matrix subject, 
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( 56) try' (win' (John')) (John') 
and (52b) is assigned a semantic structure like (57), in which the meaning 
of seem is a function applying to the whole proposition "John wins": 
(55) seem' (win' (John)) 
Similarly, it is assumed that the semantic structures of (53a) and 
(53b) must differ along the lines of (56) and (56): 
(56) persuade'(be-present'(John'))(John')(Mary') 
(57) believe'(be-present'(John'))(Mary') 
This kind of assumption appears most recently in a paper by Ewan Klein 
and Ivan Sag called "Semantic Type and Control", read at the 1981 Annual 
Meeting of the Linguistic Society of America. I don't want to discuss 
the very interesting and ingenious explanation of control properties 
of verbs that they present, but rather merely note that their analysis 
rests in part on the assumption that the basic lexical meanings of, say, 
try and seem differ in semantic type in just the way (56) and (57) indicate. 
(What they do in the paper is propose a set of rule-independent semantic 
principles that in each case will resolve the discrepancy between the 
lexical type of a verb and the syntactic structure in which that verb 
appears in such a way as to predict all control properties correctly.) 
However, this traditional and time-honored assumption about a differ-
ence in the semantic structures of Equi and Raising verbs is quite gratui-
tous; rather it suffices for the grammar to put together the meanings 
of Equi and Raising sentences in exactly the same compositional way . 
Specifically, the meaning of the matrix verb in both (52a) and (52b) 
can quite simply be treated as a function applying to a VP meaning to 
give another VP meaning (much as Montague did in PTQ), and this is then 
applied to the subject meaning to give that of the whole sentence. To 
say the same thing, these verbs will denote relations between individuals 
and properties. Thus the meanings of both sentences can be produced 
compositionally as in (58)-(59) 
(58) try' (win') (John') 
(59) seem'(win')(John') 
The same goes, mutatis mutandis, for persuade and believe, as in (60) 
and (61) 
(60) persuade ' ('be-present ' )(John')(Mary') 
(61) believe ' (be-present')(John ' )(Mary') 
What semantic differences there are between each pair of cases can , and , 
I believe, should be treated entirely as a matter of semantic entailments 
of the lexical meaning of these verbs, not of their lexical semantic type , 
nor of their specified "control properties", 
First, consider the assumption that the meaning of seem has a single, 
propositional argument . This assumption must be due to the fact that 
so-called raising sentences with seem are (approximately) paraphrasable 
with that-clauses such as (62) : 
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(62) It seems that Mary won. 
However, as Sag and Klein themselves recognize, a propositional-argument 
seem and a subject-and-infinitive-argument seem are in principle 
completely interdefinable, as might be made explicit by a "meaning postulate" 
(63) : 
( 63) vt VP D ( seeml' CP ( 1> )) ~ seem2' (P) <fl ) ) 
This means that any conceivable semantic entailment that we would need 
to capture with "propositional" seem (or seem1) could equivalently be 
captured with "individual and property" seem (or seem2), and conversely. 
Thus there is no real reason for taking one or the other as the more basic. 
Similarly with Equi verbs like try, a predicate~ that takes only 
an individual and a VP meaning as argument is interdefinable with a predi-
cate try that takes an individual subject and a "like-subject" proposi-1
tional complement as arguments: cf. meaning postulate (64) : 6 
(64) '1~ \/P D [ f {x try 1 (P(xi,))(x*)} ~ try 1 (P)(~ )]}
1 2 
So once again, there is really no semantic motivation for taking either 
as more basic . 
In the case of try, the intuitive notion that this verb MUST be analyzed 
semantically in terms of an "invisible" embedded subject for the complement 
verb seems to be a hard notion for linguists to rid themselves of, so 
let me further explicate this point by reference to an analogous situation . 
In the early 1970's George Lakoff observed that active and passive sentences 
with the adverb willingly differed in their possible interpretations, 
as (65) versus (66) indicate : 
(65) The doctor willingly examined John. 
(66) John was willingly examined the doctor. 
In order to explain this so-called "passive willingly" reading of (66), 
Lakoff (1970) assumed that willingly is a semantic predicate which has 
its own subject in underlying structure, independently of the subject 
of the main verb. This subject would be the same as that of the main 
verb in (65) but can be the same as the surface subject in (66) . Thus 
Lakoff proposed that these examples have semantic structures (67) and 
(68) respectively: 
(67) willingly'(the doctor examine John)(the doctor') 
(68) willingly'(the doctor examine John)(John') 
However, the well-known predicate-modifier analysis of adverbs of Stalnaker 
and Thomason (1973) showed that this complicated analysis was unnecessary. 
By treating passive verb phrases as predicates in their own right (rather 
than deriving them from active sentences) and by treating willingly as 
a predicate modifier (a word that combines with a predicate to give a 
new predicate), the logical forms (69) and (70) suffice to describe all 
the semantic properties of these examples correctly: 
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(69) willingly'(examine John')(the doctor) 
(70) willingly'(be examined by the doctor')(John) 
The point to observe here is that, semantically, the logical type of 
willingly under the Stalnaker-Thomason analysis is exactly the same as 
that of try under the analysis I am defending, hence a "double" subject 
for~ sentences is just as superfluous semantically as a "double" subject 
for willingly sentences. If we wanted to formally capture the fact that 
the sentence "John was willingly examined by the doctor" entails , say , 
"John was willing that the doctor examine him" then we could do so by 
means of the meaning postulate (71): 
(71) v'i) vP D [willingly'(P)("'P )-+ i) {x be-willing-that ' (P(x*))(x*)}] 
But by the same token we could also capture by a meaning postulate alone 
the fact that the sentence "John tried to win" entails "John intended 
that he win" i.e. by the postul ate (72) : 
(72) v,t> IJP C[ try'(P)(~ ) -+ 1Hx intend-that'(P(x*))(x*)}] 
The point is, there is enough "information" in the formula on the left 
side of the conditional in both cases to be able to describe all necess-
ary entailments as artifacts of the lexical meaning if willingly or try 
respectively. 
Now it might be supposed that there is in fact motivation for taking 
the lexical logical types of Equi and Raising to be as Klein and Sag and 
others have taken them to be because their analysis would obviate the 
need for separate lexical entries to relate the seem that takes raising 
to the seem that takes that-clauses, or to relate the persuade that occurs 
in (73a)to the persuade that occurs in (73b). 
(73) a. John persuaded Mary to be present . 
b. John persuaded Mary that she should be present . 
However , this is not so, for three reasons . First, this consideration 
still does not in itself determine which of the two logical types that 
must be related is the more basic, e.g. does not give us reason to say 
that propositional-argument seem is more basic than "raising" seem. Second, 
as Klein and Sag themselves observe , there are actually additional idio-
syncratic differences in the meanings of many verbs from one subcategoriza-
tion frame to another . For example, to get a paraphrase of (73a) in a 
structure with a full complement clause as well as direct object , we need 
to add a modal should in the complement (cf. (73b)), and even this is 
not quite a paraphrase of (73a), as Klein and Sag note. So even if the 
verbs are treated as having the same logical type in the two cases, the 
double lexical entries are needed anyway to capture these further differ-
ences in meaning. Third, there are some Subject Raising verbs, like tend, 
which have no counterpart with a that-clause, so with such verbs there 
is no motivation at all from such considerations for having the ireaning 
of the verb represented as a predicate of propositions . The same point 
can be made for object-Equi verbs like force, which likewise cannot be 
paraphrased in English with a full complement clause. 
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It is conunonly supposed, of course, that there are also syntactic 
dirferences between Equi verbs and Raising verbs--speficially, that Raising 
but not Equi verbs permit dummy subjects or objects such as the it of 
"Extraposition" and there--and that this difference is to be explained 
either by deriving Equi and Raising sentences from different deep structures 
or else explained by a difference in the grammatical relations or composi-
tional semantic structures assigned to these two classes of verbs . Since 
the analysis I am defending here po8its no such difference, this difference 
in the distribution of dummies like there and it has often been viewed 
as a significant problem for the categorial analysis (as it was for Montague ' s 
original analyses) . 
However, there is a difference in the lexical meanings of Equi and 
Raising Verbs whose significance has not been fully appreciated . To t he 
best of my knowledge, every Equi verb has what used to be called "select-
ional restrictions" on its controlling NP , while every Raising verb has 
no such restrictions on the corresponding surface NPs . I take it it i s 
now universally agreed that the proper way to describe selectional restric-
tions is that these are entailments , or conventional implicatures, of 
the meanings of verbs with regard to their arguments. Thus the anomaly 
of (74) 
(74) a . ?The proposition tried to be true . 
b . ?Water tries to consist of hydrogen and oxygen. 
is to be explained by the assumption that the verb .!:..El. conventionally 
implicates (or entails and conventionally implicates) that its subject 
is a sentient being capable of volition . 
Now it certainly can be claimed to follow from the classical trans-
formational analysis of Raising verbs that there should be no such selectional 
restrictions applying to the "raised" NP, and if selectional restrictions 
are semantic in origin, the same can be said to be true of analyses in 
which Raising verbs are assigned a propositional argument, rather than 
an individual argument, in semantic structure . On the other hand, it 
is an accident, according to these analyses , that all Equi verbs do have 
such selectional restrictions . After all, not all argument positions 
of all verbs have any selectional restrictions at all . 
What I want to suggest here is that the presence of a selectional 
restriction for its NP argument may be the only thing that distinguishes 
Equi from Raising verbs; the difference in dummy NP behavior can be shown 
7to follow from this alone . . 
In particular, this result will follow if we adopt what has been 
8called an "ugly object" analysis of there- insertion sentences . By this 
I mean an analysis in which the word there is treated as a kind of NP 
and is assigned a denotation just like all other NPs are; the difference 
is that this denotation is a so-called "ugly object," an entity that is 
quite different from other NP denotations in the universe of discourse . 
The semantic rules are then set up in such a way that predicates of exis-
tential sentences, such as be a unicorn in the garden, are given an interpre-
tation in which their subject will play a vacuous role. Just to illustrate 
one way of carrying this out, we might arrange the rules so that the phrase 
be a unicorn in the garden is translated with vacuous lambda abstract ion 
for its subject argument, as in (75) 
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(75) denotation of be a unicorn in the garden: 
A1) [3x[unicorn'(x) A in-the-garden'(x)]] 
The sentence there is a unicorn in the garden will then translate directly 
into (76) 
(76) Ai> [J x[unicorn'(x) A in-the-garden ' (x)]J(ugly-object ' ) 
but since the lambda binding is vacuous, this is equivalent to (77): 
(77) 3x[unicorn(x) A in- the-garden'(x)) 
Now it is a well-known consequence of such an "ugly object" analysis of 
the simple form that I have sketched that it would treat sentences like 
(78) as syntactically we]l-fonned and at most only semantically deviant: 
(78) ?There walks to the post office. 
But more upsetting than this is that (79) would be generated with the 
same interpretation as there is a unicorn in the garden (in addition to 
its correct interpretation). 
(79) John is a unicorn in the garden . 
However, it is not hard to avoid these unwelcome consequences, if 
we wish to do so, by making use of a syntacti featur and the feature-
passing conventions of GPSG to restrict the NP there to cooccurrence with 
existential VPs . (Such a treatment was once proposed by Gazdar in unpublished 
work.) 
To carry this suggestion out , let us write the rule for forming exis-
tential VP s . 
(80) If a c NP, S £ PP or Adj, then F80 (a, S) e IV[+there]' where 
F80 (a, S) = be a S. 
Translation : A'f) [S'(-a')] 
We next add a rule that combines the NP there with a VP bearing the 
feature [+there] and thereby eliminates the "there" feature : 
(81) If a£ NP[+there]' S £ IV[+there]' then F81 (a, S) € S[-there]' 
(F is otherwise like the subject-predicate operation)81 
Translation: S'(~a') 
I assume that when a VP with the feature [+there] is combined with a VP 
complement verb such as seem, !EX, or expect, the syntactic feature conven-
tions will pass this feature [+there] up onto the higher VP that is formed . 
Thus an example like there seems to be a unicorn in the garden will be 
produced as in the analysis tree (82) : 
believeTV/IV the garden]IV[+there] 
a unico~ 
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(82) [there seems to be a unicorn in the garden] 
8 
[seem to be a unico~n in the g~rden]IV[+ h ] there.._[ h ] ~---- t ere Nt' +t ere 
seemIV/IV [be a unicorn in the garden]IV[+there) 
a unicor~ [in gardenJpp 
Note that the semantics of this sentence will be given correctly by the 
same lexical and compositional semantic interpretations needed for sentences 
where there does not occur, e.g. for John seems to have left. 
Of course we still need to account for the appearance of there in 
direct object position in sentences like John believes there to be a unicorn 
in the garden. We could do this by adding a,second rule parallel to (82) 
for object position, but since we have introduced the idea of rule schema 
generalizing over granunatical relations, we can here again take advantage 
of such schema to account for there in both positions by the same rule . 
The schema needed would be (83) 
(83) If a E: NP[+there], f3 E: Vn[+there], then Fa/a, f3) E: 
<V l[ th ] . where n 2 . n- - ere 
Translation: f3'(a ' ) 
Where the value of n equals 2, this schema would lead to analyses trees 
such as (84): 
(84) [John believed there to be a unicorn in the garden] 
[believe there to be 
[believe to be a unicorn in the garden]TV[+thereJ ther~P[+there] 
garde~P 
(Note that the semantics again comes out right.) However, this schema 
as it stands is not exactly right, for the syntactic operation that (83) 
purports to generalize over really has to consist of two distinct opera-
tions, a subject-predicate operation that puts the NP to the left of the 
VP, and a verb-object operation that right-wraps the transitive VP around 
the object NP. In fact, what we should do is replace (83) with a meta-
rule (in the sense of Gazdar 1982) generalized over grammatical relations, 
a rule that takes existing basic rules such as the subject-predicate and 
verb-object rules as input and gives derived rules just like these except 
that they mention the feature [+there]. But to save space, I omit this 
correction here. 
In fact, once we have taken this step of restricting the syntactic 
distribution of there, it is not really necessary to treat the denotation 
of there as a vacuous "ugly object" at all. Suppose we agree with the 
8 
a unicorn in the garden] 
1
V oh~ 
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suggestion of John Lyons (1967) and John Kimball (1973) that existential 
sentences are a kind of generalized locative, asserting that their indef-
inite NP is 11 located11 in the current universe of discourse of the conversa-
tion (or something like this). We could then let there denote, say, a 
sort of generalized location or a discourse. Then we could set up the 
semantics of the VP of an existential sentence, for example be a unicorn 
in the garden, to denote the property that locations or discourses have 
when they contain a unicorn that is in the garden. Whether we take this 
tack is not at issue here, however. (Of course, there are other aspects 
of the semantics of existential sentences which I have not attempted to 
discuss or incorporate into the translation of rule (81), but I don ' t 
think these are relevant to the issues at hand . ) 
Now let us finally return to the distinction between Equi and Raising 
verbs. By saying that Equi verbs such as try have a selectional restriction 
for subject, I mean that the essential characteristic of Equi verbs like 
_.!:.!:Y. is that they have a conventional implicature and/or entailment approxi-
mately of the form of (85): 
(85) \l~vPD[try'(P)(~) ->- sentient-being'(,i) )] 
By saying that Raising verbs have no such implicature, I mean that their 
essential characteristic is that any entailments that follow from the 
meaning of these verbs have the form of (86), where 6 is some predicate 
of prepositions. 
(86) \l,t) VPD[seem(P)(~)->- o (P { ~ })] 
In other words, from the meaning of seem, no entailments about the meaning 
of the subject by itself follow at all,only entailments about the proposi-
tion formed from putting the meaning of the subject with the meaning of 
the object . This means that no untoward entailments follow from the mean-
ing of (87); on the other hand, (88) will be generated as syntactically 
well-formed but will have the anomalous entailment that the "ugly" object 
denoted by there is a sentient being: 
(87) There seems to be a unicorn in the garden . 
(88) ?There tried to be a unicorn in the garden. 
And I propose that nothing further needs to be said about the anomaly 
of (88) beyond this. To put it in different terms, the anomaly of (88) 
is claimed to arise for exactly the same reason as the anomaly of (74): 
(74) a. ?The proposition tried to be true. 
b. ?Water tries to consist of hydrogen and oxygen . 
To be sure, this flies in the face of traditional wisdom that (88) is 
syntactically ill-formed while (74) is only semantically anomalous; how-
ever, both these examples are clearly deviant, and the history of 
syntactic and semantic theory has taught us that traditional assumptions 
about which anomalies are syntactic and which are semantic are often best 
revised. 9 
Before closing this pa~er, I should connnent on the appeal to meaning 
postulates I have made in analyzing the entailments of the lexical meanings 
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of~ and seem. One sometimes hears the objection that meaning postulates 
are ad hoc and that "with meaning postulates, one can do anything," as 
if their use added an unwelcome power that might not be present in certain 
other theories. This is false. First, there are conceivable restrictions 
on model-theoretic interpretation which cannot be captured by meaning 
postulates (Barbara Partee, personal communication), but more importantly, 
this objection rests on a misunderstanding of the role that meaning postu-
lates play in model-theoretic semantics. It is an important feature of 
model-theoretic semantics that it leaves the values assigned to lexical 
meanings deliberately unspecified. To say that .!El. is treated as a non-
logical constant of type <s, <s, <e,t>>, <e,t>> (or equivalently, to say 
that try translates into a constant try' of intensional logic of this 
type) is to say that its interpretation in any of the arbitrarily chosen 
models defined by the theory is some function in the set:10 
I X J 
I x J 
Of course, in the actual model for the English language we all speak, the 
meaning of _!:!.Y is just one particular function in this huge set, but the 
basic theory does not tell us which model this is . This approach (quite 
prudently) allows us to postpone specifying the actual semantics for try 
(and most other lexical meanings) while carefully circumscribing the --
range within which each meaning lies. 11 Meaning postulates are just one 
technical device for narrowing down the class of possible meanings for 
a lexical item (though not fixing it uniquely) in order that certain 
important classes of entailments from this item can be shown to be formally 
describable. I f the actual model for English were some day precisely 
determined (and the unique semantic value for .!:.!:Y were thereby fixed), 
then all (correct) meaning postulates involving !EX would be completely 
redundant, as these would simply be statements about entailments that 
this actual meaning bad "already", as it were, determined. 
If we now compare this treatment of lexical meaning with other kinds 
of semantic theories, e.g. the Lexical Functional Grammar of Kaplan and 
Bresnan (1981), we find that lexical meanings are also treated as unanalyzed 
primitives in these theories. Of course, any viable semantic theory must 
provide the means for specifying, sooner or later, more about these lexical 
meanings, whether one uses meaning postulates or some other device. To 
take a familiar example, it is an uncontroversiaJ fact that a sentence 
Siegfried killed the dragon entails The dragon died, and anyone ' s theory 
must allow this kind of fact to be captured eventually. Moreover, it 
is now almost universally agreed that this fact should be attributed to 
the lexical meaning of kill rather than as an artifact of sentence semantics 
(as in Generative Semantics). It is hard to see (and certainly has not 
been shown) how a theory of lexical semantics would allow this kind of 
entilment to be captured and yet prohibit the kind of lexical entailment 
I have ascribed to !!:z. in (63) or to seem in (64). We could not for example 
prohibit a theory of lexical meaning from "manipulating grammatical relations" 
altogether, since in the case of the kill example, the NP the dragon is a 
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direct object in the original sentence but a subject in the entailed 
sentence. Thus there is no prima facie reason to believe that the account 
of lexical meaning in Lexical Functional Grammar (or any other theory) 
can in principle be more restrictive than the one I have appealed to in 
this paper. 
Thus the central point of the argument in this section of the paper 
can be succinctly stated : it is one of simplicity . Any theory must be 
able to ascribe entailments to the meanings of lexical items. Since it 
appears that under any reasonable theory of lexical meaning the relevant 
entailments of Equi and Raising sentences can all be captured from the 
simple compositional semantic structures try'(win')(John ' ) and seem'(win') 
(John'), there is simply no good argument for assuming the compositional 
semantics of these sentences is any more complicated than this. Of course, 
I have not presented any direct arguments that this compositional structure 
is not more complicated, and one cannot rule out the possibility that, 
for example, psycholinguistic experiments may someday show that the status 
of John as the subject of win in John tried to win is more "psychologically 
real" than the status of thedragon as the subject of die in Siegfried 
killed the dragon or of John as the subject of is willing in (66). But 
until such evidence has been presented, it seems reasonable to place the 
burden of proof on those who would advocate the more complicated composi-
tional analysis. In defending a lexical reanalysis of the passive and 
other such transformations, Bresnan (1978) once speculated that "it is 
easier for us to look something up than to compute it ." If this speculation 
is correct, then a purely lexical account of the "control properties" 
of Equi and Raising verbs is to be preferred, since it is perfectly feasible 
and simplifies compositional (i.e. "computed'') semantics. While the account 
of dummy NPs that I have included to accompany this analysis may well 
be improved upon , or completely supplanted, the much more basic issue raised 
by the analysis of Equi and Raising verbs presented here is, I believe, 
one that any compositional theory of semantics cannot ignore. 
Footnotes 
~~This paper was presented at a conference on grammatical relations 
at Harvard University on December 12, 1981. It will also appear in the 
proceedings of this conference, edited by Annie Zaenen and distributed 
by the Indiana University Linguistics Club. 
1The role of translation into intensional logic in Montague Grammar 
must not be misunderstood: this translation step is primarily for the 
convenience of the users of the theory and could be by-passed if desired . 
It is only the model-theoretic interpretation of English resulting 
indirectly from this translation step which is ultimately of importance 
to the theory . 
21 do mean to imply that so-called thematic relations (Agent, Patient, 
Goal , etc.) play no role in natural languages whatsoever . It is well-
known that there is an early stage of language acquisition at which 
children in effect rely on such relations rather than grammatical morphemes 
to interpret sentences (i .e. at that stage at which they may interpret 
The man ate the meat and The man was eaten by the meat as synonymous), 
and certain aphasics who have lost the ability to process syntactic 
structure appear to do so as well (Zurif and Blumstein 1978) . Rather, 
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I mean simply that the full grammatical system of normal "adult" languages 
I am acquainted with seems to be describable in the most natural and simple 
way without appeal to ·such thematic relations. Evidence may be eventually 
forthcoming that an appeal to thematic relations in grammar is needed 
in some way as well, but I do not believe this need has been clearly demon-
strated yet. Also, the existence of "true" or "deep" ergative languages 
such as Dyribal and the simplicity with which they can be described in 
the present framework (Dowty 1982, Schmerling t979, Trechsel 1981) shows 
that such thematic relations do not correlate with grammatical relations 
in a language-universal way at all. 
3Even if we somehow reconciled the claim that there can be two direct 
objects in a clause with the categorial analysis, it would not be obvious 
how to make sense out of the semantics of such an analysis. This is because 
the argument hierarchy of a verb, i . e. its grammatical relations, is the 
only means for determining which NP is which argument of the verb . (And 
unlike the Relation Grammar, I cannot appeal to an underlying stratum 
of the derivation to distinguish the two, for there is only one stratum 
of GR in the categorial account . ) Nevertheless, a sentence such as John 
gave Mary the book is not in any way vague or ambiguous as to the inter-
pretation of these two objects (as we might expect it to be in the cate-
gorial theory if both these NPs literally bore the same grammatical 
relation); rather, it clearly means that John gave the book to Mary, not 
that John gave Mary to the book. 
4An alternative analysis of impersonal passives has been proposed 
by Perlmutter (1978), involving the Un-Accusative Hypothesis (UAR) and 
the One-Advancement Exclusiveness Law (lAEX). Though I do not have any-
thing to say about many of the facts about impersonal passives supposedly 
captured by this analysis, I will comment on three points . First , the 
UAH/lAEX analysis requires that impersonal passives have at some stage 
a dummy DO NP in addition to their underlying subject, this NP being advanced 
to subject by Passive . However, I see no independent syntactic motivation 
for an intermediate-stage DO in impersonal passives , nor any semantic 
motivation for this NP; as mentioned above, moreover, this dummy is not 
really motivated as even a surface subject in German and Turkish. Given 
the methodological assumptions with which I began--that syntactic and 
semantic analysis need not and should not depart from surface syntactic 
form unnecessarily--it is clearly desirable to dispense with this inter-
mediate dunnny. Secondly , while it is problematic enough that Perlmutter 
admits that the two "universal" classes of predicates posited by the UAR 
(i . e. "unergatives" vs. "unaccusatives") are not semantically characteri-
zable in the same way in all languages, it is even worse that Nerbonne 
(this volume) has observed one language, Lithuanian, in which impersonal 
passives can be formed with verbs of all of the six semantic types explicitly 
characterized as "unaccusatives" by Perlmutter . Further examples of "un-
accusative" impersonal passives have been pointed out in Irish (Nerbonne, 
personal communication) and in Arabic (Fuller, in preparation). Thus 
the prediction of the UAH/lAEX analysis of impersonal passives is either 
wrong in the case of these languages, or else the UAR is empirically vacuous 
as a universal since there would have to be at least one language, 
Lithuanian, which has virtually (or absolutely) no unaccusative predicates. 
There may well be many languages in which unaccusative predicates do not 
form impersonal passives, but this generalization can be described in 
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the categorial analysis simply by making it a conventional implicature 
of the impersonal passive rule that the action denoted is not a voluntary 
action of a human agent (or an involuntary bodily process) ; cf . Nerbonne 
(this volume). Of course, it would not follow from anything else in this 
theory that such a restriction should hold, but since it is not a truly 
universal fact about languages that impersonal passives are restricted 
in this way, this is not a very damaging objection. Thirdly, Brian Joseph 
has pointed out to me that the predictions made by this dummy analysis 
of impersonal passives with respect to unaccusatives only hold if the 
lAEX is valid . In fact, apparent counterexamples to the lAEX have been 
noted by Nerbonne, Gerdts (1980), and perhaps elsewhere. If the lAEX 
is abandoned, then the Lithuanian, Irish and Arabic data are not a problem 
for the UAR per se, since the UAH and dummy analysis of impersonals now 
make no predictions about unaccusatives. 
5When I say no motivation, I mean of course no motivation other than 
the theoretical assumption of Relational Grammar that an NP that is bene-
factive in meaning must necessarily not be a DO in the lowest stratum; 
as I have said, I see no necessity for saying that grammatical relations 
are universally semantically characterizable in terms like agent, patient 
or benefactive. 
6This same point about try is made in Dowty, Wall and Peters (1981) , 
pp. 235-236. 
7This suggestion dates from a letter I wrote to Richmond Thomason 
in 1975, though I did not develop the analysis in detail at that time. 
8Though "ugly object" analyses of dummy NPs have been widely discussed 
(the term is due to Lauri Karttunen, I believe) , the only published example 
of such an analysis that I know of is Sag (1982); his treatment differs 
in a number o[ ways from that sketched below, however. 
9rf it is objected that (88) sounds more anomalous than (74), and 
an explanation is wanted, I can offer this: Of all the real-world entities 
that there are, the question of which entities have the ability to "try" 
to do things is more of a synthetic than analytic fact , and we can imagine 
with some effort, say, science fiction stories in which some inanimate 
things like propositions might have the attributes necessary to be able 
to "try" things. But the semantics of the existential construction is 
a res sui generis; we do not predicate anything of the entity or situation 
denoted by "there" except in existential sentences , and it is hard to 
imagine the semantics of such sentences being different without departing 
radically from the English language, This may also account for the subtle 
intuition that in trying to make sense out of an anomalous sentence such 
as There tried to be a unicorn in the garden, we are more likely to try 
to imagine try as a Raising verb than to interpret there as having a sentient 
denotation; it has been observed, after all, that verbs of English have 
often shifted historically from the Equi to the Raising class (Ard , 1977) . 
lOFor an explanation of this notation, see Dowty, Wall and Peters 
(1981) . 
11For a lengthy excursus into the possibilities for describing word 
meaning in model-theoretic semantics, see Dowty (1979). 
- 132 -
References 
Ard, John. (1977) Raising and Word Order in Diachronic Syntax, distributed 
by the Indiana University Linguistics Club. 
Bach, Emmon. (1980) "In Defense of Passive," Linguistics and Philosophy 
3 . 3.297-341. 
Bach, Emmon. (1982) "Temporal Relations and Control," in G. Pullum and 
P . Jacobson (eds.), On the Nature of Syntactic Representation. 
Dordrecht: D. Reidel. 
Brame, Michael K. (1978) Base Generated Syntax. Seattle: Noit Amrofer. 
Bresnan, Joan W. (1978) "A Realistic Transformational Grammar , " in M. 
Halle, J. Bresnan and G. Miller (eds.), Linguistic Theory and Psycho-
logical Reality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1- 59 . 
Curme, G. (1922) Grammar of the German Language. London : MacMillan. 
Dowty, David R. (1975) "Toward a Theory of Word Formation for Montague 
Grammar," in S. Schmerling (ed . ), Texas Linguistic Forum 2, University 
of Texas Department of Linguistics, 69-96 . 
Dowty, David R. (1978) "Lexically Governed Transformations as Lexical 
Rules in a Montague Grammar," Linguistic Inquiry 9.3 . 393-426. 
Dowty, David R. (1979) Word Meaning and Montague Grammar. Dordrecht: 
D . Reidel. 
Dowty, David R. (1982) "Grammatical Relations and Montague Grammar," 
in G. Pullum and P. Jacobson (eds . ), On the Nature of Syntactic 
Representation . Dordrecht : D. Reidel, 79-130. 
Dowty, David R., Robert E . Wall, and Stanley Peters . (1981) Introduction 
to Montague Semantics. Dordrecht: Reidel . 
Fuller, Douglas. (in preparation) A Formal Analysis of the Classical 
Arabic Verbal System. OSU Ph.D. dissertation. 
Gazdar, Gerald and Ivan Sag. (1981) "Passive and Reflexives in Phrase 
Structure Grammar," in J. A. G. Groenendijk, T. M. V. Janssen and 
M. B. V. Stokhof (eds.), Formal Methods in the Study of Language, 
Part 1.131-152 . 
Gazdar, Gerald. (1982) "Phrase Structure Grammar," in G. Pullum and P. 
Jacobson (eds.), Rn the Nature of Syntactic Representation . Dordrecht: 
Reidel. 
Gerdts, D. (1980) "Causal to Object Advancement in Halkomelem," CLS 16, 
83-101. 
Jacobson, Pauline . (1981) "Comments on David Perlmutter's paper at the 
1981 Annual Meeting of the Linguistic Society of America." 
Kaplan, Ronald M. and Joan W. Bresnan. (1981) Lexical-Functional Grammar: 
A Formal System for Grammatical Representation . MIT Center for 
Cognitive Science Occasional Paper# 13 . 
Keenan, Edward and Bernard Comrie . (1977) "Noun Phrase Accessibility 
and Universal Grammar," Linguistic Inquiry 8.1.62-100. 
Keenan, Edward and Judith Gary. (1977) "On Collapsing Grammatical Relations 
in Universal Grannnar," in P. Cole and J . Sadock (eds.), Syntax and 
Semantics Vol . 8: Grammatical Relations. New York: Academic Press, 
83-120. 
Klein, Ewan and Ivan Sag . (1981) "Semantic Type and Control," paper read 
at the 1981 Annual Meeting of the Linguistic Society of America. 
Lakoff, George. (1970) "Adverbs and Opacity," distributed by the Indiana 
University Linguistics Club. 
- 133 -
Lyons, J. ( 1967) "A Note on Possessive, Locative and Existential 
Sentences," Foundations of Language 3 .390-96. 
Montague, Richard. (1973) "The Proper Treatment of Quantification in 
Ordinary English," in J . Hintikka, J. Moravcsik, and P. Suppes (eds . ) , 
Approaches to Natural Languages . Dordrecht: Reidel. 
Nerbonne, John. (1982) "The German Impersonal Passive: A Non-Structure-
Preserving Lexical Rule ," paper read at the First West Coast Conference 
on Formal Semantics. 
Nerbonne, John. (This volume) "Some Passives Not Characterized by Universal 
Rules: Subjectless lmpersonals," OSU WPL 26 . 59-92. 
Partee, Barbara . (1979) "Montague Grammar and the Well-Formedness Constraint," 
in F. Reny and H. Schnelle (eds.), Syntax and Semantics Vol. 10: 
Selections from the Third Groningen Round Table. New York: Academic 
Press, 275-313. 
Perlmutter, David and Paul Postal. (1977) "Toward a Universal Characteri-
zation of Passivization," in Whistler et al. (eds . ), Proceedings of 
the Third Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistic Society, 393-417 . 
Perlmutter, David. (1978) "Impersonal Passives and the Unaccusative 
Hypothesis," in Proceedings of the Berkeley Linguistic Society, Vol. 4. 
Quine, Willard V. 0. (1966) "Variables Explained Away," in W. V. 0. 
Quine, Selected Logic Papers, New York: Random House, 227-243. 
Sag, Ivan. ( 1982) "A Semantic Theory of 'NP Movement' Dependencies," 
in G. Pullum and P. Jacobson (eds.), On the Nature of Syntactic Repre-
sentation. Dordrecht: Reidel. 
Schmerling, Susan . (1979) "A Categorial Analysis of Dyirbal Ergativity," 
in C. Smith and S . Schmerling (eds.), Texas Linguistic Forum 13, 
96-112. 
Schoenfinkel, Moses. (1924) "Ueber die Bausteine der matematischen Logic," 
Mathematische Annalen 92 . 305-316. 
Seiter, William J . (1979) "Instrumental Advancement in Niuean, 11 Linguistic 
Inquiry 10.4.595-622. 
Stalnaker, Robert and Richmond Thomason. (1973) "A Semantic Theory of 
Adverbs," Linguistic Inquiry 4 .2. 195-220. 
Trechsel, Frank P. (1981) A Categorial Treatment of Quichean (Mayan) 
Ergativity. University of Texas Dissertation. 
Trithart, Lee. (1979) "Topicality: An Alternative to the Relational 
View of Bantu Passive ," Studies in African Linguistics 10.1.1-30. 
von Stechow, A. (1979) "Deutsche Wortstellung und Montague-Grammatik," 
in J. Meisel and Pam , Linear Order and Generative Theory. Amsterdam: 
John Benjamins (Current Issues in Linguistic Theory vol. 7). 
Zurif, Edgar B. and Sheila E . Blumstein . (1978) "Language and the Brain," 
in M. Halle, J. Bresnan and G. Miller (eds . ), Linguistic Theory and 
Psychological Reality, Cambridge , MA: MIT Press. 229-246. 
